shaoshi20/dshscan
C3Security scanner for DSH plugins: static and semantic passes over plugin source, DSH-specific attack-surface rules, npm audit, batch scanning, and an HTML report with per-finding severity and evidence
★ 5+ · shaoshi20/dshscan source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
shaoshi20/dshscan is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, decodes base64 payloads, starts a network server.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./cordis.patch.yml |
| executes system commands | exec | ×13 in authored code, e.g. src/rules.ts:30, src/scanner.ts:1 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×1 in authored code, e.g. src/scanner.ts:882 |
| starts a network server | net_server | ×1 in authored code, e.g. src/cli.ts:343 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | DSCAN_LLM_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY |
Services it injects
tools
Outbound domains
api.openai.com
Environment variables it reads
DSCAN_INDEX DSCAN_HISTORY DSCAN_LLM_API_KEY OPENAI_API_KEY DSCAN_LLM_BASE_URL DSCAN_LLM_MODEL
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.