plastic-labs/honcho

C2

Memory library for building stateful agents

★ 8.0k · plastic-labs/honcho source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

plastic-labs/honcho is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C2 — one powerful capability or sensitive behavior. It runs code at install time, executes system commands, base64 decoding in build output only, starts a network server.

A skill, not an installable plugin — ships SKILL.md with no plugin manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
runs code at install timeinstall_scriptpreinstall: node -e "const ua=process.env.npm_config_user_agent||'';if(ua.includes('npm')&&!ua.includes('bun')){console.error('❌ Please use bun instead of npm!\n📦 Run: bun install\n🌐 Install bun: http
executes system commandsexec×4 in authored code, e.g. kilo-honcho/src/key-dialog.ts:1, integrations/cursor/src/common.ts:65
base64 decoding in build output onlybase64_decode_bundled×2 in build output only, e.g. integrations/cursor/dist/hook.js:2163, integrations/cursor/dist/hook.js:2224
starts a network servernet_server×4 in authored code, e.g. mcp/src/http.ts:281, mcp/src/index.ts:117
reads credential-class env varstoken_envHONCHO_API_KEY

Tool registrations

0 static tool registration point(s).

Outbound domains

api.honcho.dev honcho.dev app.honcho.dev

Environment variables it reads

HONCHO_API_KEY HONCHO_WORKSPACE_ID HONCHO_URL HONCHO_PEER_NAME HONCHO_API_URL HONCHO_BASE_URL HONCHO_WORKSPACE KILO_HONCHO_CONFIG_PATH HONCHO_TIMEOUT_MS SENTRY_DSN

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.