muyuanjin/dsh-ptc-plus
C3A session-bound agent-native REPL for DeepSeek Harness PTC mode.
★ 10+ · muyuanjin/dsh-ptc-plus source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
muyuanjin/dsh-ptc-plus is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, can rewrite the system prompt, executes system commands, uses eval / new Function.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./cordis.patch.yml |
| can rewrite the system prompt | prompt_surface | systemPrompt, system-prompt/assemble |
| executes system commands | exec | ×6 in authored code, e.g. internal/isolated-worker.js:1, internal/worker-cwd-virtualization.js:89 |
| uses eval / new Function | eval | ×5 in authored code, e.g. compiler-amaro.cjs:3, internal/dynamic-native-runtime.js:239 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×1 in authored code, e.g. internal/compiler-text.js:14 |
| powerful capability in test/example code only | dev_surface | in code that does not ship: tools/pre-execute |
Services it injects
agents connection llm locale remote slots systemPrompt tools
Hooks it attaches
agent-preset/selected agent/created agent/disposed agent/pre-step connection/reset llm/stream session/disposed system-prompt/assemble tools/change tools/execute tools/result
Environment variables it reads
NODE_V8_COVERAGE DSH_PTC_COMPILER_BYTECODE
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.