morluto/rea

C2

Reverse engineer anything with agents, from app behavior down to native binaries.

★ 445k+ · morluto/rea source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

morluto/rea is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C2 — one powerful capability or sensitive behavior. It executes system commands, uses eval / new Function, decodes base64 payloads, starts a network server.

A skill, not an installable plugin — ships SKILL.md with no plugin manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
executes system commandsexec×180 in authored code, e.g. scripts/build-conformance-fixtures.mjs:1, scripts/build-ghidra-nativeaot.mjs:2
uses eval / new Functioneval×1 in authored code, e.g. scripts/verify-qwen-client.mjs:333
decodes base64 payloadsbase64_decode×7 in authored code, e.g. scripts/verify-binary-layout.mjs:341, scripts/verify-binary-layout.mjs:628
starts a network servernet_server×8 in authored code, e.g. scripts/record-mcp-catalog.mjs:54, scripts/verify-package-update.mjs:30
reads credential-class env varstoken_envGH_TOKEN, REA_BROWSER_VERIFIER_SECRET

Tool registrations

0 confirmed registration point(s); analysis is incomplete.

5989 source file(s) omitted by size/count/encoding limits; tool count is incomplete

Outbound domains

www.hopperapp.com schemas.android.com www.npmjs.com api.github.com rea.tools

Environment variables it reads

JAVA_HOME GHIDRA_INSTALL_DIR GITHUB_OUTPUT GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY REA_VERIFY_RUNTIME_ROOT REA_CC REA_BROWSER_EXECUTABLE NODE_OPTIONS GHIDRA_HEADLESS_MAXMEM HOPPER_LAUNCHER_PATH

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.