laosji/clamicro
C2在手机上审批 Claude Code 、DeepSeek Harness 的操作。局域网直连，零依赖。
★ 1+ · laosji/clamicro source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
laosji/clamicro is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C2 — one powerful capability or sensitive behavior. It runs code at install time, gates tool execution, executes system commands, decodes base64 payloads.
Not installable — declares only dsh.client, which dsh plugin add cannot install
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| runs code at install time | install_script | postinstall: node -e "console.log('\n Clamicro 已下载。执行 npx clamicro install 完成安装。\n')" |
| gates tool execution | tool_gate | hook: tools/pre-execute |
| executes system commands | exec | ×66 in authored code, e.g. cli.mjs:2, cli.mjs:2 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×1 in authored code, e.g. scripts/shots.mjs:357 |
| starts a network server | net_server | ×2 in authored code, e.g. server.mjs:998, scripts/codex-probe.mjs:79 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | CLAMICRO_SETTLED_KEY_GRACE_MS |
Services it injects
slots
Hooks it attaches
approval/request session/event tools/pre-execute
Environment variables it reads
CLAMICRO_PORT CODEX_BIN SHOT_PORT CHROME CLAMICRO_APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_MS CODEX_HOME CLAMICRO_SETTLED_KEY_GRACE_MS SHARP_PATH
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.