kenryu42/cc-safety-net
C3A pre-execution guard for AI coding agents. It blocks destructive Git and file system commands, plus common attempts to access sensitive files, before a tool call runs. Supports Amp Code, Antigravity
★ 1.6k · kenryu42/cc-safety-net source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
kenryu42/cc-safety-net is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, decodes base64 payloads, starts a network server.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./dist/deepseek-harness/cordis.patch.yml |
| executes system commands | exec | ×26 in authored code, e.g. scripts/build.ts:38, scripts/check-comments.ts:3 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×1 in authored code, e.g. src/gate/secret/secret-protection.ts:1526 |
| starts a network server | net_server | ×2 in authored code, e.g. src/gui/index.ts:173, src/gui/index.ts:179 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | CC_SAFETY_NET_GITHUB_ISSUES_WEBHOOK_SECRET |
Services it injects
tools
Outbound domains
ccsafetynet.com api.github.com
Environment variables it reads
NO_COLOR CC_SAFETY_NET_HOME CC_SAFETY_NET_GITHUB_ISSUES_WEBHOOK_SECRET
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.