irisblackwood/focus-guard
C3Hook-level guardrails for DSH: blocks unverified edits, high-risk commands, and context-burning reads, with an auditable trail for every block.
★ 1+ · irisblackwood/focus-guard source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
irisblackwood/focus-guard is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, runs code at install time, executes system commands, reads credential-class env vars.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./src/dsh/cordis.patch.yml |
| runs code at install time | install_script | postinstall: node tools/first-run-sweep.mjs |
| executes system commands | exec | ×43 in authored code, e.g. packages/core/hooks/guard.mjs:35, packages/core/hooks/guard.mjs:35 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | OPENVIKING_API_KEY |
Tool registrations
1 confirmed registration point(s); analysis is incomplete.
packages/core/src/dsh/tools.mjs:110tools.registerpackages/core/src/dsh/index.js:288Context or tools service passed to an unresolved helper
Services it injects
tools
Environment variables it reads
FG_AUDIT_FILE FG_CASE_FILE FG_SESSIONS_DIR FG_REPO_ROOT FG_WORKSPACE_FILE USERPROFILE ComSpec FG_STATUS_FILE FG_APPROVAL_DIR FG_RUN_ID
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.