gtaifu/dsh-wechat-bridge
C2DeepSeek Harness (dsh) transport plugin: chat with your agents on WeChat via official Tencent iLink bot API — zero runtime deps, no OpenClaw, QR-code login, one friend = one persistent agent session.
★ 10+ · gtaifu/dsh-wechat-bridge source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
gtaifu/dsh-wechat-bridge is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C2 — one powerful capability or sensitive behavior. It command execution in build output only, starts a network server, reads credential-class env vars.
No dsh integration found — this repository carries the dsh-plugin topic but shows no sign of connecting to dsh
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| command execution in build output only | exec_bundled | ×3 in build output only, e.g. lib/core.mjs:7, lib/core.mjs:161 |
| starts a network server | net_server | ×2 in authored code, e.g. bridge.mjs:178, test-mock-ilink.mjs:141 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | DSH_BRIDGE_TOKEN, DSH_WXBOT_AUTH_FILE |
Outbound domains
ilinkai.weixin.qq.com novac2c.cdn.weixin.qq.com
Environment variables it reads
APPDATA MOCK_MSG1_TEXT MOCK_QR_MODE MOCK_STALE_ONCE DSH_WXBOT_BASE_URL DSH_WXBOT_CHANNEL_VERSION DSH_WXBOT_AGENT DSH_WXBOT_AUTH_FILE DSH_WXBOT_SYNC_BUF DSH_WXBOT_ALLOW_FROM
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.