abbccdd/dsh-WhaleMate

C3

★ 0 · abbccdd/dsh-WhaleMate source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

abbccdd/dsh-WhaleMate is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, can rewrite the system prompt, can intercept API traffic, command execution in build output only.

Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
patches the dsh runtimeruntime_patch./cordis.patch.yml
can rewrite the system promptprompt_surfaceapiProxy, webServer, system-prompt/assemble
can intercept API trafficapi_interceptapiProxy, webServer, system-prompt/assemble
command execution in build output onlyexec_bundled×46 in build output only, e.g. lib/install-companions.mjs:5, lib/permissions.mjs:3
reads credential-class env varstoken_envPOND_TOKEN, QQBOT_SECRET, QQBOT_TOKEN_BASE_URL

Tool registrations

1 confirmed registration point(s); analysis is incomplete.

Services it injects

agents apiProxy connection llm slots tools webServer

Hooks it attaches

approval/request session/event system-prompt/assemble

Outbound domains

api.bilibili.com www.bilibili.com api.live.bilibili.com t.bilibili.com api.vc.bilibili.com live.bilibili.com comment.bilibili.com space.bilibili.com search.bilibili.com api.bot.qq.com

Environment variables it reads

USERPROFILE DSH_HOME BILI_WHALE_CONFIG POND_HOME WHALE_FRAME_DIR ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE SystemRoot POND_TOKEN BILI_COMMENT_REVIEWED BILI_MAX_SECS

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.