ZSeven-W/dsh-android

C3

DeepSeek Harness plugin for Android — build, run, and interact with a live emulator or USB device stream inside a conversation, driven entirely through adb.

★ 100+ · ZSeven-W/dsh-android source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

ZSeven-W/dsh-android is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, uses eval / new Function, decodes base64 payloads.

Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
patches the dsh runtimeruntime_patch./cordis.patch.yml
executes system commandsexec×14 in authored code, e.g. scripts/dev-adb-smoke.mjs:25, scripts/dev-adb-smoke.mjs:389
uses eval / new Functioneval×1 in authored code, e.g. scripts/_smoke-harness.mjs:143
decodes base64 payloadsbase64_decode×6 in authored code, e.g. scripts/dev-adb-smoke.mjs:40, scripts/dev-qa-driver-smoke.mjs:113
starts a network servernet_server×2 in authored code, e.g. scripts/_smoke-harness.mjs:77, scripts/dev-routes-static-smoke.mjs:163

Services it injects

locale slots theme tools

Hooks it attaches

locale/change theme/change

Environment variables it reads

DSH_ANDROID_SWIFTC DSHPLUGIN_ANDROID_SWIFTC DSH_SMOKE_ADB_LOG DSH_SMOKE_NO_DATE DSH_SMOKE_PID DSH_SMOKE_LOG_LINES DSH_SMOKE_FOLLOW_MARKER DSH_SMOKE_PHONE_ONLINE DSH_SMOKE_PM_FAIL DSH_SOURCE_ROOT

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.