PGZXB/dsh-feishu
C3The Feishu UI for DeepSeek Harness — a panel-driven control console: every slash command a button on the ⚙️ control-panel card, in-card approvals & questions, live streaming cards, one-QR setup. | De
★ 10+ · PGZXB/dsh-feishu source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
PGZXB/dsh-feishu is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, reads credential-class env vars.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./cordis.patch.yml |
| executes system commands | exec | ×11 in authored code, e.g. src/projects.ts:19, src/setup/cli.ts:14 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | FEISHU_APP_SECRET |
Hooks it attaches
agent/assistant-stream approval/request session/event user-questions/request
Outbound domains
open.feishu.cn ask.feishu.cn accounts.feishu.cn
Environment variables it reads
DSH_BIN FEISHU_TRANSPORT FEISHU_MOCK_BOT_OPEN_ID FEISHU_MEMORY_ATTACHMENTS FEISHU_DEBUG FEISHU_APP_ID FEISHU_APP_SECRET DSH_HOME FEISHU_ALLOWED_USERS FEISHU_ALLOWED_CHATS
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.