JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote
C3Auditable, token-gated DeepSeek Harness remote gateway: mobile QR access, per-device sessions, Host/Origin rewrite, settings/credentials/directory support.
★ 10+ · JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry
JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, decodes base64 payloads, starts a network server.
Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest
What it can do
| Capability | Flag | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| patches the dsh runtime | runtime_patch | ./cordis.patch.yml |
| executes system commands | exec | ×12 in authored code, e.g. scripts/audit-prod.mjs:1, scripts/audit-prod.mjs:7 |
| decodes base64 payloads | base64_decode | ×2 in authored code, e.g. scripts/capture-screenshots.ts:155, scripts/capture-screenshots.ts:163 |
| starts a network server | net_server | ×3 in authored code, e.g. scripts/browser-smoke.mjs:16, scripts/capture-screenshots.ts:215 |
| reads credential-class env vars | token_env | DSH_SKIP_AUTH |
Services it injects
connection slots webServer
Environment variables it reads
DSH_HOME HARNESS_DIR AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS PATH_DELIMITER EXTRA_PATCHES PORT PACK_PLUGIN DSH_SKIP_AUTH
How to read this
Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.
Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.