JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote

C3

Auditable, token-gated DeepSeek Harness remote gateway: mobile QR access, per-device sessions, Host/Origin rewrite, settings/credentials/directory support.

★ 50+ · JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

JUANWANG-BUAA/dsh-full-remote is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, executes system commands, decodes base64 payloads, starts a network server.

Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
patches the dsh runtimeruntime_patch./cordis.patch.yml
executes system commandsexec×26 in authored code, e.g. scripts/audit-prod.mjs:1, scripts/audit-prod.mjs:7
decodes base64 payloadsbase64_decode×2 in authored code, e.g. scripts/capture-screenshots.ts:157, scripts/capture-screenshots.ts:165
starts a network servernet_server×7 in authored code, e.g. scripts/benchmark-session.mjs:29, scripts/benchmark-session.mjs:35
reads credential-class env varstoken_envDSH_SKIP_AUTH

Tool registrations

0 static tool registration point(s).

Services it injects

connection sessions slots uiSession webServer

Environment variables it reads

DSH_HOME BENCH_BASE DSH_BROWSER_CDP HARNESS_DIR AUDIT_TIMEOUT_MS BENCH_ROUNDS BENCH_REPEATS DSH_WEB_FRONTEND_DIST PATH_DELIMITER EXTRA_PATCHES

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.