FuRongJun-1999/dsh-memory

C3

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★ 500+ · FuRongJun-1999/dsh-memory source on GitHub · this plugin in the registry

FuRongJun-1999/dsh-memory is a DeepSeek Harness plugin rated C3 — powerful capability combined with sensitive behavior. It patches the dsh runtime, can rewrite the system prompt, executes system commands, reads credential-class env vars.

Installable plugin — declares a dsh.bundle manifest

What it can do

CapabilityFlagEvidence
patches the dsh runtimeruntime_patch./dsh/cordis.patch.yml
can rewrite the system promptprompt_surfacesystem-prompt/assemble
executes system commandsexec×2 in authored code, e.g. src/bridge.ts:10, src/bridge.ts:228
reads credential-class env varstoken_envMDCG_LEGACY_ENV_AUTH, MDCG_TOKEN, ROLEPLAY_EDIT_KEY

Tool registrations

2 confirmed registration point(s); analysis is incomplete.

Services it injects

slots tools

Hooks it attaches

session/event system-prompt/assemble

Environment variables it reads

DSH_ROOT HIVE_REPO HIVE_LIB MDCG_ROOT MDCG_LEGACY_ENV_AUTH PYTHONPATH DSH_HOME ROLEPLAY_EDIT_KEY MDCG_AUX_ROOT MDCG_AUTO_ISSUE

How to read this

Levels measure capability surface and transparency, not maliciousness. A C3 plugin can be entirely legitimate — a desktop shell genuinely needs subprocesses. The point is that you can see this before installing. See the levels explained and how dsh plugins work.

Findings come from static analysis of shipped code; nothing is executed. Think a flag is wrong? Open an issue — every flag cites the file and line it came from.